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PEOPLE 1'. MASON

[Crim. No. 6528.

In Bank.

[54 C.2d

May 17, 1960.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ROBERT L. MASON,
Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Evidence-Deliberation and Premeditation.-A conviction of first degree murder on the theory that defendant had
formed a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill the deceased's daughter was sustained by evidence that over a period
of time defendant developed a growing animosity toward the
daughter either because of her rejection of him or accusations
against him, such as that he attacked her on one occasion with
his hands, on another occasion with a screw driver, and then
with a recently-acquired gun, resulting in the death of her
mother. (Pen. Code, § 189.)
[2] Id.-Evidence.-A conviction of first degree murder could be
sustained on the theory that the killing was perpetrated by
means of lying in wait or was committed in the perpetration
of burglary where there was evidence that he took a gun and
entered the house of deceased's daughter through the back
door, that he stayed in the house alone that night and the next
day, and that when the daughter came home with her mother
and son, defendant came out of the bedroom closet with gun
in hand, shots were exchanged, the mother was killed, and the
daughter was seriously injured.
[3] Id.-Instructions-Killing by Lying in Wait.-Instructions in
a homicide case as to killing by lying in wait did not eliminate
malice aforethought as an essential ingredient of murder perpetrated by means of lying in wait where they made clear that,
although a specific intent to kill is not required to commit
murder by lying in wait, it was necessary that there be the
intentional inflicting of bodily injury on the person killed
under circumstances likely to cause his death.
[4] Id.-Murder in First Degree-Killing in Perpetration of Burglary: Instructions. - Although the killing occurred in the
house of deceased's daughter about 20 hours after defendant
entered it, if the jury found that defendant committed burglary
by entering the house with the intent to cOlllmit a felonious assault, the homicide and burglary were parts of one continuous
transaction, and the court did not err in instructing the jury
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 172 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide,
§§ 464,465.
[-1] SI'C Cal.Jur.2d, HOlllicid!', ~77:Am.Jur., HOlllieide, §39.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 1:j8; [2] Homicide,
§ 145(3); [3] Homicide, § 185; [4] Homicide, §§ 15(6), 188;
[5] Homicide, § 242.
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that murder cOlllmittrd in the p('rpctration of burg-Inry is first
deg-ree murder.
[6] Id.-Punishment.--f::rlertion of life imprisonment or death :IS
the punishment for first deg-rt.'c murder is within the absolute
discretion of the jury.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b» from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. Mark
Brandler, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder and for assault with intent to
murder. Judgment of conviction, imposing death penalty
with reference to murder charge, affirmed.
Carl B. Shapiro, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Jack E. Goertzen, Deputy
Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-A jury found defendant guilty of the
first degree murder of Suzan Jamerson and fi.~ed the penalty
at death. It also found him guilty of an assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to murder Rona Porrazzo, Suzan's daughter. (Pen. Code, § 217.) The trial court denied defendant's
motion for a new trial and entered judgment on the verdicts.
This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
Defendant met Rona and her husband several years before
the homicide and was a frequent visitor at their home. On a
Sunday afternoon in the summer of 1957, Rona came home
after visiting her mother and found defendant alone in the
house. An argument developed over a loan of $20 defendant
claimed he made to Rona's mother, and Rona picked up the
telephone to call her mother to ask about the loan. Defendant
grabbed Rona and wrested the phone from her. Rona then
said that she had to get ready to go to work, and defendant
asked her to drop him off on her way, which she did. Rona
complained about the incident to her husband, and he 8.$lted
defendant not to come to the house when he was not there.
Rona testified that on February 27, 1958 defendant came to
the house in the evening after she had returned from church
and put her 4-year-old son to bed. Her husband was at work
at a nightclub as a musician. Defendant cntered, and they sat
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in III(' ldtt')\('n urillkillg col1'('e and talking. About 12 :50 a. m.
wn~ time to leaY<'. Defell(lant
attempted to rmbra('.e hcr, and she pushed him away. He thc11
threw her UOWl~ 011 a couch and attempted to chokc her, first
with his hanus, and then with his necktie, which brokc. lIc
accused her of bcing "more than friendly" and "that "'ay"
with other friends aud complained that she would not even be
nicc to him. Defendant left after Rona promised not to call
the police. Rona required medical treatment because of this
attack, and she filed a criminal complaint against defendant.
'1'he jury was unable to reach a verdid, and the action was
uismissed. Defendant has at all times denied that he attacked
Rona 011 February 27th or that he was at her home that
evening. He testified that ROlla accused him to protect the
perSOll who actually attacked her and that his subsequent
meetings with her were to make her tell the truth about the
February 27th incident.
Because of fear of defendant and the fact that he had a key
to their Hollywood home, Rona and her husband and son
moved in May 1958 to a house in Glendale located behind a
duplex where Rona's mother lived.
About 1 :30 a.Ill. in the morning following Thanksgiving
Day, 1958, Rona left the restaurant where she \vorked and
went to her car at a nearby parking lot. She testified that
defendant appeared, attacked her with his hands and fists, and
threatened to kill her and her husband if she "put the finger"
on him this time. Defendant testified that the meeting was
prearranged and that Rona attacked him first by hitting him
on the head with her shoe. After this encounter Rona's husband bought her a gun, and they made arrangements so that
Rona would not have to drive home from work alone.
In January 1959 Rona's husband was working at a nightclub in Las Vegas and his mother and father were staying at
the Glendale home with Rona and her son. Shortly after 2 a.m.
Rona's supervisor drove her home from work, and her fatherin-law met her at the front door. She went toward the back
of the house, which was dark, and defendant, who had entered
surreptitiously through the back door or window, grabbed her
arm, struck her on thc head with a scre\v driver, and dragged
her through the kitchen toward the back door. She screamed
and her mother-in-law and father-in-law came to her assistance. Her father-in-law got the screw driver away from
defendant, who then escaped. Owing to the darknes~, Rona
could not identify defendant at the time, but he admitted at
the trial that it "'as he who was involved ill this incident.

HOlla told drfl'lHlallt that it
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R-Ollu's parents-in-law moved away from the Glendale home,
and ROlla anu h('r SOil join('u ill'1' hu.'.lJalld in Las Vegas. The
weekeJl(I befol'e 'J'u('fi(lay, Februlll'Y 17, 1939, Rona '8 husband
jrove them ba~k to Gll'uuale. lIe returned to Las Vegas on
Monday, l\ncl Ht.'!lU and her son moyed into her mother's home
in the duplex on the fl'ont of the property. Rona was afraid '
to star alone in the house ill the rear.
Early ill Fehruary d('felldallt arranged with a friend to buy
a reyoh'er, and 011 the 16th of February they took it out ill
the country and tested it. That night about 10 p.m. defendant
took the gun aud entel'ed Hona's house through the back door.
He testified that he had talked to Rona 011 the telephone and
that she had asked him to eome. She testified that there was
110 such eOllwrsatioll, DL'fendallt stayed in the house alone
that uight and tlle Ilext day. About 6 or 6 :30 p.m. on February 17th, Hona came home with her mother and son. She
intended to retul'll to Las Vegas the next day. She wanted to
get a sweater from her house before going into her mother's
house and asked her mother and SOl1 to go ,vith her. She
thought she had her gun in her eoat poeket at the time. After
the three enterell the house, Rona saw "hat appeared to be
an arm ill a coatsleeve showing through the opening in the
bedroom closet door. She screamed and ran, and defendant
came out of the closet with a gun in his hand. Shots were
exehanged, and ROlla's mother was killed and Rona was seriously injurrd by bullets from defendant's gun. Defendant
eseaped and was subsequently arrested in Arizona.
Defendant te!;tifieu that he took the loaded gun to Rona's
home solcl." to frighten her so that she would tell the truth
about the February 27th attack. He hid in the closet when he
saw Rona approaching with her moth('r and son intending to
wait thrre until they left to see Rona alone. R-Ona tried to pull
the eloset door open and he tried to hold it closed. 'When he
finally eame out of the closet, nona ran into the Ih:illg room
and serenme(l. lIe t11rl1 ran into the liYing room and obseryed
Rona's mot her stand ing in a hall way oetwrcn the bedroom
and ldtehen. A shot was fired and defendant drew his gun
and started ::;hooting.
Defendatit also testified that he commcnced having sexual
relations with HOlla in 1957 and eontinued to do so until just
before the attack of Fl'bruary 27, 1938, and there is evidence
that he told Rona's husband that he had done so and otherwise
sought to break up the marriage. Rona te!>tified that she had
never had sexual relations with defendant.

.
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[1] The evidence is suffieient to support the verdicts.
\Vhatever resolution the jury made of the confliet between defendant's and "Hona 's testimony with respect to the attack on
Fehruary 27, 1958, and the events leading up to it, it could
reasonahly conclude that thereafter defendant developed a
growing animosity toward Rona either because of her rejection
of him or accusations against him. Thus, he attacked her with
his hands the day after Thanksgiying 1958, with a screw driver
in January 1959, and with a recently-acquired gun Oil February 17, 1959. The jury could find that the last attack was a
deliberate and premeditated attempt to kill Rona that resulted in the death of her mother. Such a killing is murder of
the first degree. (People v. Slttie, 41 Ca1.2d 483, 491-492 [261
P.2d 241] ; Pen. Code, § 189.)
[2] Ewn if the jury was not cOllvinced that defendant
had formed a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill Rona,
it could have concluded that the killing was murder of the
first degree becau;:;e it was perpetrated by means of lying in
wait or was committed in the perpetration of burglary. (Pen.
Code, § 189.) [3] The jury was fully instructed on both of
these theories, and contrary to defendant's contention, the
lying in wait instructions did not eliminate malice aforethought
as an essential ingredient of murder perpetrated hy means of
lying in wait. The instructions were substantially those approved in People v. Atchley, 53 Ca1.2d 160, 175 [346 P.2d
764], and made clear that although a specific intent to kill is
not required to commit murder by lying in wait, "it is necessary that there be the intentional inflicting of bodily injury
upon the person killed under circumstances likely to cause his
death."
Defendant contcnds that thc trial court erred in instructing
the jury with respect to murder committed in the perpetration
of burglary on the ground that the burglary, if any, was completed when defendant entered the house with the intent to
commit the felony of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.
Code, §§ 245, 459) and that therefore the killing about 20
hours later was not committed in the perpetration of burglary.
In People v. Chavez, 37 Ca1.2d 656, 669-670 [234 P.2d 632],
we stated: "The law of this state has ncver required proof
of a strict causal relationship between the felony and the
homicide. The statute was adopted for the protection of the
community and its residents, 110t for the benefit of the lawbreaker, and thi~ court has viewed it as oln'iatillg the necessity
for, ratlirr than re(juirillg, allY teelilli('al in!juiry eOlleerning
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whether there has heen a l·ulIlplvti"!I. ahandollment, or desiste111'e o[ the f,'lony hero:'!' Ih(' homil'idl' ,'.'a~ ,·ompleted.
"In People v. Boss, 210 CaJ. 24;), 2;')2, 2;)0 [2PO P. 881],
this court said that the felony murdl'r rule' . . . was adopteu
to make punishment of this class of erime more certain. It
was not intenued to relieve thewrollgdoer from allY probable
consequences of his act by platillg a limitation upon the res
gestae ,,,hieh is unreasonahle or unnatural.' The homicide is
committrd in the perpetration of thc felony if the killing and
felony are parts of one continuous transaction. (People v.
Miller, ]21 Cal. 343 [53 P. 816].)"
[ 4] Although the killing in the present ease occurreu
about 20 hours after defendant ent!'l'ed the house, if the jury
found that defendant eommitted burg-Iar)" by entering the
house \vith the intcnt to e01l1111it a felonious assault, the homicide and the burglary were parts of one ('olltinuons transaction. (See People v. Witt. 170 Cal. 104, 106 [148 P. 928] :
People Y. Kdso, 25 Ca1.2<l 848, 851 [155 P.2d 819] ; People Y.
Jfo1'lock, 46 Ca1.2d 141, 146-147 [292 P.2d 897); People v.
Clteal'Y, 48 Ca1.2d 301, 310, 318 [309 P.2d 431} ; People v.
Jones, 52 Ca1.2d 636, 651 [343 P.2d 577}.) ..:\.('cordingly, the
trial court did not err in instructing the jury that murder
committed ill the perpetration of burglary is murder of the
first degree.
[5] Defendant contends finally that it is a denial of due
process of law to permit the jury to fix the penalty without
prescribing standards to guide the exercise of its power. It
is settled, however, that the seledion of life imprisonment or
death as thc punishment for first degree murder is within
the absolute discretion of the jury. (People v. Green, 47
Ca1.2d 209, 232 [302 P.2d 307J ; People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d
749,764-768 [306 P.2d 463] ; People v. JOlles, 52 Ca1.2d 636,
652 [343 P.2<l 577}.)
The judgment alld the order denying the motion for a new
trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Dooling, J. pro tem.,· concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 14,
1960.

• Assigllcll I.y Chainll;!n of Ju,lieial Council.

